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We present an introduction to a novel model of an individual and group opinion dynamics, taking
into account different ways in which different sources of information are filtered due to cognitive
biases. The agent based model, using Bayesian updating of the individual belief distribution, is
based on the recent psychology work by Dan Kahan. Open nature of the model allows to study the
effects of both static and time-dependent biases and information processing filters. In particular,
the paper compares the effects of two important psychological mechanisms: the confirmation bias
and the politically motivated reasoning. Depending on the effectiveness of the information filtering
(agent bias), the agents confronted with an objective information source may either reach a consensus
based on the truth, or remain divided despite the evidence. In general, the model might provide
an understanding into the increasingly polarized modern societies, especially as it allows mixing of
different types of filters: psychological, social, and algorithmic.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The actual processes through which individual people
and groups of people evaluate information and form or
change their opinions are very complex. Psychology of-
fers many descriptions of these processes, often includ-
ing multiple pre-conditions and influencing factors. The
assumption that opinions form through a truth-seeking,
rational reasoning is, unfortunately, not true in most
cases. The list of the recognized cognitive biases that
influence our mental processes (rational and emotional)
is very long, covering over 175 named entries (Benson
[8]). The situation becomes even more complex when
we try to describe how the individual opinion changes
combine to form dynamical social systems. In addition
to the problems alluded to above, one has to consider
the multiple forms of social interactions: personal (fact
to face and, especially in recent years, those mediated
by electronic media) and public (news, comments, ru-
mours and other modes of information reaching an in-
dividual). These interactions vary with respect to their
informative and emotional content, trust to the source
of the information, its pervasiveness and strength and
more. Taking these difficulties into account, the task of
an accurate description of the individual and group opin-
ion change dynamics appears insurmountable. Yet, the
need to understand how and why our societies (especially
democratic ones) arrive at certain decisions, how and why
people change their beliefs (or why they remain uncon-
vinced in the light of ‘overwhelming evidence’), what are
the mechanisms driving the increasing polarization of our
societies and how to make people talk to and understand
each other, is so great that despite the challenges, there
is intense research on the topic.
For several years, group opinion change has been a fer-
tile ground for sociophysics and Agent Based Modelling.
The initial works have used many of the tools and ideas
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developed to describe magnetic phenomena and used the
analogies between atomic spin states and opinions, mag-
netic field and external influences to derive statistical de-
scriptions of global opinion changes. There are many ap-
proaches, for example the voter model [7, 20, 25, 35], the
Sznajd model [10, 72–74, 82–84, 92], the bounded con-
fidence model Deffuant et al. [27, 28], Weisbuch et al.
[101], Weisbuch [102], the Hegelsmann-Krause model
[42], the social impact model of Nowak-Latané [61, 62]
and its further modifications including the role of leaders
[43, 48, 49, 76], and many more others. Historically, the
initial focus was on the formation of consensus — treated
as a form of a phase transition — but the later works fo-
cused on the role of minorities, with special attention
given to the effects of presence of inflexible, extremist
individuals.
The literature on numerical models of opinion dynam-
ics has grown enormously in the past decade. For a rela-
tively recent reviews we point out Castellano [19], Castel-
lano et al. [21], Galam [34]. While most of the early
works were limited to studies of themodels themselves
(rather than specific social contexts), showing very inter-
esting sociophysical results, but only weak, qualitative
correspondence to any actual societies (Sobkowicz [75]),
the recent years have changed this situation. Availabil-
ity of large scale datasets, documenting opinions and in-
teractions between people (derived mainly from the In-
ternet and social media), has allowed, in principle, to
attempt quantitative descriptions of specific opinion evo-
lution processes. The number of sociophysical and ABM
based works aimed at quantitative description of real so-
cieties remains limited. For example, in the case of polit-
ical elections, only a few papers attempt such description
(Caruso and Castorina [18], Fonseca and Louca [32], For-
tunato and Castellano [33], Galam [36], Palombi and Toti
[66], Sobkowicz [81]).
Despite the undoubted advances, the sociophysical
models of the individual behaviour are still rather
crude. Most of the sociophysical agents and descrip-
tions of their individual behaviour are too simplistic, too
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2much ‘spin-like’, and thus unable to capture the intrica-
cies of our behaviours. This observation applies also to
the descriptions of the interactions between the agents,
or, in more general way, to the way that new informa-
tion is treated in the process of adjusting currently held
opinions. Most of the Agent Based Models assume rel-
atively simple forms of such interactions, for example
rules which state that if an agent is surrounded by other
agents holding an opinion different than its own, it would
change it opinion to conform to the majority. As expe-
rience with real life situation shows, such ‘forced’ con-
version is rather unlikely among people (in contrast with
atomic spins. . . ). The differences between the model be-
haviour of spin-persons (spinsons, Nyczka and Sznajd-
Weron [63]) and our understanding of real people have
forced the introduction of special classes of agents, behav-
ing in a way that is different from the rest: conformists,
anticonformists, contrarians, inflexibles, fanatics... Us-
ing appropriate mixtures of ‘normal’ and special agents
it has been possible to make the models reproduce more
complex types of social behaviour.
In the author’s opinion, such artificial division of the
agents into separate classes with different, fixed internal
dynamics, while improving the models’ range of results, is
psychologically incorrect. In a specific situation any per-
son may behave inflexibly or show contrarian behaviour.
For this reason, the author has proposed a model in which
opinion change results from a combination of agent’s in-
formation and emotional state, coupled with the infor-
mative and emotional content of the message processed
by the agent (which may originate from an interaction
with another agent or from the media). The model, in-
troduced in Sobkowicz [77, 78] has allowed a quantitative
description of an Internet discussion forum [79] and even
to predict the results of recent elections in Poland [81].
The model applies however only to situations in which
the emotional component is very strong, determining the
individual behaviour.
One of the most active discussions in psychology of
belief dynamics is centred around apparently irrational
processing of information: the operation of biases, heuris-
tic shortcuts and other effects that stand in contrast with
the classical tenets of the rational choice theory. Such os-
tensibly irrational behaviours have not received much at-
tention within the ABM community so far, despite their
presence in many social situations. Important examples
are provided by strong opposition to well documented
arguments in cases of climate change, vaccination, en-
ergy policies etc. There are well known differences in
risk perception and reactions, leading to strong polariza-
tion almost beyond capacity to communicate (Kahneman
[52], Opaluch and Segerson [65], Sunstein [88, 89], Sun-
stein et al. [90], Sunstein [91], Tversky and Kahneman
[96, 97, 98], Tversky et al. [100]). Our current work has
been motivated by the recent studies (Kahan [50, 51]),
which describe in detail the Politically Motivated Reason-
ing Paradigm (PMRP). We aim to create an Agent Based
Model using biased information processing and Bayesian
updating. Despite the recognized status of the Bayesian
updating in risk assessment and other areas, it is rather
seldom used by the ABM community. To mention a few
examples, Suen [87] has considered the effects of informa-
tion coarsening (due to the agents’ reliance on specialists
for the relevant information) and the tendency to choose
the sources which confirm their pre-existing beliefs; Mar-
tins [56] has studied the case of continuous opinion model
under Bayes rules, looking for long term evolution of the
opinions; Bullock [16] has studied the conditions in which
peoples’ beliefs, updated using Bayesian rules could, in
the short term, instead of converging on a true value,
diverge or even polarize. Ngampruetikorn and Stephens
[59] have analysed the role of confirmation bias in consen-
sus formation in a binary opinion model on a dynamically
evolving network.
The flexibility offered by the Bayesian approach allows
much greater complexity of the behaviour of the indi-
vidual agents, and as such, offers potentially more rele-
vant descriptions of social behaviours than the spin-based
models. Of course, these benefits do not come without
a price: there are many more degrees of freedom in the
system, and therefore many more unknowns in properly
setting up the ABM simulations. Still, the importance
of social phenomena observed around the world, in par-
ticular various forms and effects of polarization, suggests
the need for a deeper understanding of the underlying
mechanisms, and makes the effort worthwhile.
A. Confirmation bias vs. PMRP
One of the best recognized biases in information pro-
cessing is confirmation bias, defined by the Wikipedia as
‘a tendency to search for, interpret, favour, and recall in-
formation in a way that confirms one’s pre-existing beliefs
or hypotheses’. Such definition stresses that the opera-
tion of the confirmation bias may be on various levels:
selecting and preferring the information sources, giving
different weight to different sources and internal mech-
anisms (such as memory preferences is storing/recall of
information). When people communicate, the individual
confirmation bias effects may be combined in a way that
creates group effects such as echo chambers. As a result,
even when faced with true information, and agent (or a
group of agents) may form or maintain a false opinion
due to the confirmation bias.
The motivated reasoning paradigm considers the ways
in which goals, needs and desires influence the informa-
tion processing (Jost et al. [46]). These goals may be re-
lated to the individual needs, but also to group or global
ones, for example the goal of achieving or maintaining the
person’s position within a social group. In such a case, the
motivated reasoning may bias the information processing
by substituting the goal of truth-seeking by the person’s
desires to affirm the affiliation with the chosen in-group.
Seen through the lens of these desires, the apparently
irrational choices (such as disbelief in well documented
3evidence and belief in unproven claims) become rational
again. We believe and act accordingly in a way that is
congruent with the perceived beliefs and actions of our
preferred social group. As the goal of the person is shifted
from truth seeking to strengthening of the position within
the social group, the disregard for the truth becomes ra-
tional. Especially, when the consequences of a rejection
from the group are more immediate and important than
the results of ‘erroneous’ perception of the world. Kahan
[50, 51] has provided a very attractive Bayesian frame-
work, allowing not only to describe the role of various
forms of cognitive biases, but also the empirical evidence
of the differing predictions of the different heuristics, such
as confirmation bias or political predispositions. Experi-
ments with manipulated ‘evidence’, described by Kahan,
are very interesting.
While both mechanisms introduced above lead away
from the truth-seeking behaviour, their predictions might
differ, especially with respect to new information. While
the confirmation bias favours evidence in agreement with
already held views (priors), the politically motivated rea-
soning selects and favours information congruent with
person’s political identity (defined by the in-group char-
acteristics). The confirmation bias depends on internal
agent states, while PMR involves perception of external
characteristics.
The vision of information processing, comparing the
two forms of bias, described by Kahan is simple enough
to become a framework of an ABM. As we shall argue,
the Bayesian filtering approach is very flexible and may
be applied to a variety of situations, contexts and types
of processing bias. Our present goal is to describe
such framework and to provide simple examples
of the types of information processing leading to
consensus or polarization. The latter case is of special
importance, as the current political situation in many
democratic countries seems to be irrevocably polarized,
with large social sections unable to find common ground
on many extremely important issues. Our hope is to
find, with the use of the model, any suggestions for the
processes that may reverse this polarization and enable
communication across the current divisions.
II. INDIVIDUAL INFORMATION PROCESSING
MODEL
A. Overview of the model
The current work aims at a general, flexible model
of the individual opinion dynamics. We base our
concepts on the Bayesian framework. Figure 1 presents
the basic process flow, modelled after Kahan [50]. For
simplicity, we shall assume that the belief which we will
be modelling may be described as a single, continuous
variable θ, ranging from -1 to +1 (providing a natural
space for opinion polarization). The agent holds some
belief on the issue, described at time t by a distribution
X(θ, t). For example, if the agent is absolutely sure that
the ‘right’ value of θ is θ0, then the distribution would
take the form of Dirac delta function centred at θ0. Less
‘certain’ agents may have a different form ofX(θ, t). This
distribution is taken as a prior for a Bayesian update,
leading to the opinion at t+ 1. In the simplest case, the
Bayesien likelihood factor would be provided by the new
information input Si(θ). Here the index i corresponds
to various possible information sources. Kahan has pro-
posed that instead of this direct update mechanism (prior
opinion+information→posterior opinion), the incoming
information is filtered by the cognitive biases or predis-
positions of the agent. The filtering function F (Si) trans-
forms the ‘raw’ information input into the filtered likeli-
hood FL(Si, θ), so that the posterior belief distribution
X(θ, t + 1) is obtained by combining the prior opinion
distribution X(θ, t) with the likelihood filter FL(Si, θ).
It is important to note that different sources of infor-
mation may be filtered in different ways. Trust in the
source, cognitive difficulty of processing the information,
its emotional context, the agent’s dominant goals – they
all may influence the ‘shape’ of the filter. Moreover, we
have to consider the ways that the information pieces
from various sources are treated. Two simple versions are
shown in Figures 2 and 3. The first treats each source
separately and in a sequential order. Such approach may
be sensible in cases where new information arrives in well
separated, time ordered units, e.g. daily newspaper edi-
tions or TV news programs. The second approach treats
the sources in an integrative way: it accumulates the fil-
tered likelihoods (each of which contains the information
and its specific filter), with some weights, into a single
total likelihood function. Such approach may be better
when various sources of information coexist at the same
moment, e.g. when a group of people discusses the TV
news. The weights associated with the sources could be
different for each information processing event, depend-
ing on the relative importance and strength of the sources
and other circumstances. Both approaches can be used
(and combined) in the case of advanced models of specific
systems.
B. Information sources
The information that influences the beliefs of people
comes from multiple types of sources. There are, of
course, personal experiences, which may provide high
impact information about specific facts and events, and,
with the application of some cognitive processes, about
trends, estimates, diversity and prognoses. The direct ex-
periences may be thought of as direct and therefore trust-
worthy, but in many cases we rely on memories, which
may provide false information. Some other cognitive bi-
ases are also relevant for the personal observations: we
may fall for certain illusions, disregard a part of experi-
ence and put emphasis on other parts, even to a degree
of actually inventing events that did not take place.
4Figure 1. Basic model of information processing. An agent holds a prior belief about an issue, described by a distribution
X(θ, t). We assume a simple, one-dimensional ‘opinion parameter’ θ ranging from -1 to 1.The information on the issue, coming
from the source Si has a distribution Si(θ).This information is filtered by a function F (Si), specific to the information source.
The form of the filtering function may vary, depending on the focus of the model. For example, if we assume fully rational,
truth-seeking agents, the filter would be centred around the ‘true’ value of the parameter θ. On the other hand, in the case
of the model based on cognitive bias, the filter function would be simply related to the prior beliefs of the agent. In the case
of PMRP, the filter is related to the distribution of beliefs held / approved by the agent’s in-group, or, more precisely, to the
agent’s perception of such distribution. Combining the information input with the filter function yields the filtered likelihood
information FL(Si). Bayesian update of the agent’s belief X(t) via FL(Si) leads to the changed, posterior distribution of
beliefs X(θ, t+ 1).
The second source of the information is related to the
group of people with whom a person identifies (the in-
group). These inputs may come from in-group infor-
mation exchanges, either in person or via electronic or
traditional communication media. The latter has become
increasingly important during the past decade, especially
among the younger population. In addition to the in-
teractions with specific individuals in the in-group, the
in-group may influence agents beliefs via cumulative indi-
cators. These would include the official or semi-official
statements of the group’s views on specific issues,
but also the unofficial and media information about
the group norms, average opinions and trends.
The latter are especially interesting, as they may come
both from within the group and from outside. In such
case the information about the in-group views and norms
may be manipulated and distorted.
The last group of the sources is related to any source
outside the in-group. This may include the interactions
with people outside one’s own self-identification
group and the media perceived as not associated with
the in-group. In case of the media the information is
prepared by someone, which includes both the selection
and presentation of the information.
The information which we use to fortify or to change
our beliefs may be manipulated ‘at source’. In personal
interactions with other people we may get the wrong im-
pressions because people due to many forms of dishonesty
or distortion. Traditional sources of news are also subject
to misrepresentation. The ideal of the fair and balanced
journalism – giving comparable attention to all contra-
dicting views – may also, at times, be considered manip-
ulative, especially when it results in undue attention and
coverage given to a tiny minority of views. A example of
negative consequences of such ‘balanced’ reporting may
be provided by the case of the anti-vaccination move-
ment (Betsch and Sachse [13], Nelson [58], Tafuri et al.
[93], Wolfe et al. [105]).
5Figure 2. Sequential model of information processing when multiple sources are present. As before, an agent holds a prior
belief about an issue, described by a distribution X(θ, t). We assume a simple, one-dimensional ‘opinion parameter’ θ ranging
from -1 to 1.The information on the issue, coming from the source Si has a distribution Si(θ). A different distribution Sk(θ)
may come from another source Sk. There filtering functions F (Si) and F (Sk) may differ, and as a consequence, the likelihood
functions FL(Si) and FL(Sk) would also differ. Bayesian update of the agent’s belief X(t) via FL(Si) and FL(Sk) is applied
sequentially, leading to the changed, posterior distribution of beliefs X(θ, t+ 1) and X(θ, t+ 2). In the case of many sources,
their relative importance may be described by the number of times they are present in the chain of evaluations.
In reality, however, much more frequent are the ma-
nipulations due to unbalanced reporting. The po-
larization of both the traditional channels (newspapers,
radio, TV) and the Internet sources (WEB versions of
the traditional channels and independent WEB pages,
blogs, Facebook pages and tweets) is a well known phe-
nomenon (Adamic and Glance [2], Campante and Hoj-
man [17], Jerit and Barabas [45], Lawrence et al. [54],
Prior [69], Stroud [86], Wojcieszak et al. [103]). Many
people rely on a limited number of information sources,
the spectrum of the information reaching him/her could
be heavily distorted. Theis selective attention/selective
exposure may lead to the echo-chamber phenomenon,
where a person sees and hears only the information sup-
porting the ‘right’ beliefs.
The US presidential election in 2016, with its increas-
ing role of social media as information sources, brought
our attention to yet another form of ‘at source’ infor-
mation manipulation: fake news. The relative ease to
create false information, in some cases supported by ma-
nipulated images, voice and video recordings, to post it
online and to create a web of self-supporting links allows
the perpetrator to spread such news. The trust associ-
ated with social networks (for example Facebook or twit-
ter links) makes spreading of such information faster –
especially if the fake news are designed to pass through
the most common information filters.
As examples, we propose three specific forms of the dis-
tributions of the source information S(θ), suitable for the
ABM approach. The first, ST (θ), corresponds to results
of social efforts to describe the phenomenon as accu-
rately and objectively as possible. Let’s assume that
for the topic in question (where the beliefs are described
by the parameter θ) there is some specific value that cor-
responds to objectively discoverable optimum, θT . This
may correspond to an exact description of a situation,
or an universally optimal solution to a problem or any
other situation in which, through rational, communica-
tive processes, it is possible to arrive at a ‘true’ value of
θT . This would mean, that eventually, all beliefs other
than this value should be labelled ‘erroneous’. We as-
sume that ST (θ) takes a form of a Gaussian distribution
centred around θT . In the following simulations we shall
use ST (θ) as the source.
The second possible form of a popular information dis-
tribution, a ‘flat’ one SF (θ), assumes that all possible val-
ues of θ are represented equally in the information stream
(an extreme version of the ‘fair and balanced’ news).
The third form, SP (θ), is designed to represent parti-
san bias in the news stream, taking a form of a sigmoidal
function, favouring one of the alternatives (for example
θ > 0). The three forms are shown in Figure 4.
C. Types of information filters
The way in which information received from various
sources is evaluated and used to form new beliefs, de-
6Figure 3. Integrative model of information processing when multiple sources are present. As before, an agent holds a prior
belief about an issue, described by a distribution X(θ, t). The information on the issue, coming from the sources Si and Sj has
a distributions Si(θ) and Sj(θ). There filtering functions F (Si) and F (Sk) may be different. As a consequence, so would the
likelihood functions FL(Si) and FL(Sk). Instead of a sequential application, the Bayesian update of the agent’s belief X(t) via
a single application of a weighted combination of FL(Si) and FL(Sk): FL(TOT ) = WiFL(Si) + WkFL(Sk), leading to the
changed, posterior distribution of beliefs X(θ, t+1). The weights determine the relative importance of the different information
sources in a single update.
pends not only on the sources, but also on the goals of
a person. These goals may allow us to construct rules
that would create and update the information filters. In
some cases they would be independent of the character-
istics of the person, in other cases they would depend on
them, which would make the process of belief modifica-
tion self-referential. Below is a partial list of the filter
types that could be used in our agent based modelling.
The filters are distinguished by their origin (internal to
the person or external), dependence on some objectively
measurable characteristics, possibility of an orchestrated
manipulation and, finally, normative value.
• Truth seeking filter. It corresponds, on an indi-
vidual level, to the objective source of information.
The truth seeking filter could take a form of a dis-
tribution localized around θT , so that the eventual,
repeated application of the information processing
would lead the agents to converge their beliefs on
θT . An example of such filter would be a narrow
Gaussian distribution centred on θT . This type of
the filter is at the core of the ‘rational discourse’
and ‘objective reality’ assumptions, and while im-
portant from the philosophical and moral stand-
points it seems to be an exception rather than a
rule in social life. Because the value of θT is in-
dependent of the agents, we categorize the truth
seeking filter into the ‘external’ category. And be-
cause the discovery of the value is assumed to rely
on well established processes (for example depend-
ing on scientific methods), we also assume that the
truth seeking filter in its pure form is not liable to
manipulation. Applied to the flat (balanced) in-
formation SF (θ) the truth seeking filter would cre-
ate a filtered information resembling the objective,
truth-related source ST (θ).
• Confirmation bias filter. The tendency to give
more weight to information supporting a person’s
current views and to disregard sources disconfirm-
ing these views is well known in psychology. Such
filter is relatively easy to be introduced into the
7Figure 4. Graphical representation of examples of information
sources. SF (θ) – the flat distribution representing an extreme
form of ‘balanced’ news. ST (θ) – an example of a distribution
focusing on a ‘true’ value accepted by the whole community.
In this example, the true value is set at θ = 0.6 and the
information distribution has a rather broad shape. Lastly,
SP (θ) represents partisan bias, in this case favouring positive
θ values at 6:1 ratio.
ABM framework: the filtering function FCB(S(θ))
could be defined in terms of the current belief
Xj(θ, t), either directly or slightly modified, for
example via some form of broadening or narrow-
ing of tolerance range for differing beliefs. A very
widely known example of the use of confirmation
bias in AMB environment is the bounded confi-
dence model (Deffuant et al. [28], Hegselmann and
Krause [42], Weisbuch [102]). In the model an agent
interacts only with other agents who have an opin-
ion sufficiently close to its own, disregarding agents
with opinions separated by more than a certain
threshold . The confirmation bias filter belongs
to the internal category, and as such, it can not be
manipulated directly by outside sources. A possi-
bility exists, however, that the manipulation would
act on the importance or tolerance of the filter in
evaluating certain sources of information.
• Memory priming/availability filter. It is an-
other example of an internal filter, which, however,
is much more easily manipulated than the confir-
mation bias filter. This is because the confirma-
tion bias compares the new information with cur-
rently held beliefs, which may be quite deeply in-
grained, especially if they depend on moral founda-
tions (Haidt [38, 39, 40], Jost et al. [47]). In con-
trast, the availability filter acts via additional at-
tention given to facts that are quickly accessible to
our minds. Thanks to various forms of priming, its
effects may be effectively stimulated and steered by
outside influence: our peers or the media (Sunstein
[89], Tversky and Kahneman [96, 99]). In terms
of an ABM approach, such filter could be approxi-
mated, for example, by the shape of the previously
encountered information source.
• Politically Motivated Reasoning (PMR) fil-
ter. The notion of the PMR filter advocated by
Kahan [50], is based on an assumption of a perfectly
rational behaviour – but with a re-defined personal
goals. Instead of the focus on the exact descrip-
tion driving the truth-seeking filter, the rationality
of a person’s actions is judged by their usefulness
for the goal of preserving or improving the position
within a specific social group (the in-group). In
such case, the dominant processes would be those
which facilitate alignment with the in-group ac-
ceptance criteria, which often include expression
of specific beliefs. Thus the PMR filter would be
based on the perceived in-group opinions. As
such, the PMR filter is an example of an external
filter, that is, in itself, based on some information
source, rather than on the internal characteristics
of the agent. For example it could be a Gaussian
distribution centred at the average belief of the in-
group. It is worth noting that in some cases it
can be manipulated. The range of such manipu-
lation depends on a specific social context. Even in
the cases when the knowledge about the in-group
beliefs comes from direct interactions between the
members of the in-group, some external social pres-
sures might limit the expression of these beliefs. For
example, political correctness might prevent overt
expressions of some opinions, leading to a departure
of the perceived average value from the ‘true’ av-
erage of internally held, but not expressed, beliefs.
Another possibility of manipulation is when the in-
formation about a large in-group (such as political
party support base) is mostly available via some
external media: press, TV, social networks... The
medium may withhold some information, enhance
some other and in such way distort the perceived
in-group opinions and thus manipulate the agent’s
PMR filter.
• Simplicity/attention limit filter. This is an in-
ternal filter, related to the culturally and technolog-
ically driven change in the way external information
is processed. Due to the information deluge, there
is an increasing dominance of short forms of com-
munication, especially in the Internet based me-
dia: WEB pages, Internet discussions, social media
(Djamasbi et al. [29, 30]). The simplification (or
oversimplification) of important issues, necessary to
fit them to the short communication modes, may
act against beliefs that are not disposed to such
simplification. This part of the filter acts at the
creation side of the information flow. Decreasing
attention span and capacity to process longer, ar-
gumentative texts act as another form of filter, this
time at the reception end of the flow. There are nu-
merous forms of psychological bias related to and
leading to such filtering, from venerable and ac-
cepted heuristics (like Occam’s razor), through the
law of triviality and bike-shed syndrome (Parkinson
8[68]), to a total disregard for too complex view-
points (Qiu et al. [70]). Together, these tenden-
cies can create a filter favouring the information
that is easily expressed in a short, catchy, memo-
rizable form. There is no simple universal form of
the filter for the ABM approach, because in differ-
ent contexts different beliefs might be easier to be
expressed in the most simple way.
• Emotional filter. Some topics, contexts and com-
munication forms may depend, in their process-
ing, on the affective or emotional content. This
may create a processing filter, for example one
that favours extreme views, as they are typi-
cally more emotional than the consensus oriented,
middle-of-the-road ones. Emotionally loaded infor-
mation elicits stronger response and longer last-
ing effects (Allen et al. [4], Barsade [6], Berger
and Milkman [9], Bosse et al. [15], Chmiel et al.
[22, 23], Clore and Huntsinger [24], Haidt [37], Hat-
field et al. [41], Nielek et al. [60], Reifen Tagar
et al. [71], Sobkowicz [77], Sobkowicz and Sobkow-
icz [80], Thagard and Findlay [95]). The specific
form of the filter depends on the mapping of the
belief range and the associated emotional values.
Furthermore, the emotional filter may depend on
the current agent belief function, e.g. anger di-
rected at information contrary to the currently held
beliefs, or at a person who acts as the source of the
information.
• Algorithmic filters. An increasing part of the
information reaching us comes from the Internet
services such as our own social media accounts, per-
sonalized search profiles etc. The service providers
organize and filter the content that reaches us of-
ten without our knowledge that any filter exists;
and even more often without the knowledge how
it works. These external algorithmic filters, shap-
ing our perception, not only skew the opinions but,
more importantly, they often limit the range of top-
ics we are aware of and the opinions related to them
(Albanie et al. [3], Pariser [67]). In some cases the
effect of an algorithmic filter is similar to the inter-
nal confirmation bias (e.g. the search engine pri-
oritizes the results based on the already recognized
preferences of the user). In other cases, the ma-
chine filter may deliberately steer the user away
from certain information, based on decisions unre-
lated to the particular user, fulfilling the goals of
some other party.
D. The filtering process
An interesting question, important for the practical
ABM implementation, is: how should the various fil-
ters be applied to obtain the relevant filtering function
F (Si, θ)? A sequential application of filters focuses on the
parts of the information that are minimized or deleted
by each filter. In contrast, parallel application focuses on
the information that is allowed by each of the filters. In
reality some of the filters are applied sequentially, that
is a person considers only the information that conforms
to all of these filters (e.g. it must be highly emotional
and in agreement with person’s views). In other cases,
some filters may be added, for example a person may
accept the information that confirms his/her views (the
confirmation bias) or the information that agrees with he
perceived views of the in-group. As a result, the overall
shape of the filter function may become quite complex.
Moreover, we should remember that even if we treat some
external filters as relatively stable, the ones associated
with person’s own views or with the in-group compliance
may evolve in time.
The Bayesian-like form of the filtering process, multi-
plying the incoming information Si(θ) by the filter func-
tion F (θ) is very efficient: a single process may decisively
change the shape of the information distribution. For
this reason we introduce here a process control parame-
ter, the filtering efficiency f . Its role is to determine the
relative strength of the influence of the specific filtering
function on the incoming information. In particular, the
effective filter function is assumed to take the form
fF (θ) + (1− f)U , where U is a uniform function.
E. Information processing and memory effects
The Bayesian processing of information may lead to
very quick and dramatic revisions of the individual be-
liefs. Some shapes of the likelihood distributions (espe-
cially those with a narrow maximum) transform prior be-
lief distributions into completely different posterior. Yet,
with some exceptions, our interactions with other people
or with the media sources are rarely so transformative.
Martins [56] has proposed a modification of the origi-
nal Bayesian rules, relaxing the transformation speed.
He has proposed that only a fraction p of encounters
with the information sources leads to informative pro-
cessing, characterized by the likelihood function FL(Si).
In the remaining 1−p cases, Martins has considered that
the source is treated as uninformative (characterized by
a uniform distribution), and the resulting information
source is a mixture of the two, in a way similar to our
treatment of the filtering efficiency.
In our approach, in the remaining 1− p cases, the en-
counter is ignored and the information is not pro-
cessed. The simplest approach to describe such situa-
tion would be to leave the belief distribution unchanged,
Xj(θ, t) = Xj(θ, t + 1), which may be treated as the
case of the agent’s perfect memory. However, as we
shall show in the next section, repeated application the
Bayesian updates leads to a narrowing of the agents’ be-
lief distributions. Eventually, the individual beliefs would
become more and more focused, which influences the
9Figure 5. Graphical representation of selected filtering types and their sources. The mix of various forms of filtering may
depend on the source of the information being evaluated, for example in certain situations the personal, truth-seeking filter
might be dominant, while in other situations the focus on the in-group acceptance would favour the PMR filter. When media
or the Internet are the source of the information, the personal filters may be modified by the effects of personalized filtering
by the search/presentation algorithms of the content providers or intentional modifications in the news industry. To allow the
possibility of imperfect application of the filters, in the final stage the ‘pure’ filtered likelihood may be combined with non-
specific, uniform function U , via the filter effectiveness factor f . The resulting function would have the form of fF + (1− f)U .
whole system dynamics. For this reason we will intro-
duce an imperfect memory mechanism that restores
some level of an individual belief indeterminacy, in
which the agent reverts partially to its intrinsic value of
the standard deviation of the X(θ, t) distribution. This
is described as follows: in the case of ignoring the infor-
mation event (probability 1− p) the agent’s belief distri-
bution does not remain unchanged but becomes
Xj(θ, t+ 1) = mXj(θ, t) + (1−m)N(〈θ〉j(t), σ0j), (1)
where the memory fidelity parameter 0 ≤ m ≤ 1 de-
scribes the ratio of preserving the current distribution
intact, and N(〈θ〉j(t), σ0j(t)) is a Gaussian distribution
centred at the current average belief of the agent 〈θ〉j(t),
but characterized by a fixed standard deviation σ0j , char-
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Figure 6. Examples of filtering mechanisms. Top panel: three
‘pure’ filters (with effectiveness f = 1). CONF (violet line):
confirmation bias taken as an example of an individual agent’s
belief, in this case a rather extreme leftist. PMR (brown
line): Politically Motivated Reasoning filter, is calculated as
and average belief of the agent’s in-group (the leftists, in this
case). EMO (red line): an example of a simple emotional
filter, favouring extreme views. Bottom panel: effects of a
an imperfect filtering, in which the effectiveness factor f is
assumed to be equal to 0.3 In such case, the resulting filter
function is given by fF +(1−f)U , where F is the ‘pure’ filter
and U is a uniform function.
acteristic for each agent. Thus for the perfect memory
(m = 1) we recover the unchanged distribution condi-
tion and for m = 0, an agent ‘left to itself’ preserves the
current average value of the belief, but resets the indeter-
minacy of its beliefs to σ0j . The information processing
is graphically presented in Figure 7.
The results of resetting the indeterminacy of an in-
dividual agent belief distribution is shown in Figure 8.
While the ‘broadening’ admixture may seem compara-
tively small (at least for the depicted m = 0.5 value), it
plays an important role in shaping the evolution of the
beliefs of the agents under the influence of information
sources. The origin of such reset of the indeterminacy
may be explained by numerous encounters with a range
of beliefs, other than the main source considered in the
simulations, which are too weak to significantly shift the
agent’s average opinion, but introduce some degree of
uncertainty.
Figure 7. Details of the information processing. The likeli-
hood function FL(Si(θ), derived from the information source
Si is applied only in case of ‘informative’ encounter, with
probability p. In such case Xj(θ, t + 1) = Xj(θ, t)FL(Si(θ)
In the remaining cases, the encounter is ignored. Without
processing the new information the agent’s belief function
may remain unchanged, or it may become somewhat relaxed,
by addition of a Gaussian function N(〈θ〉j(t), σ0j), centred
at the current average θ for the agent, and characterized
by the standard deviation equal to the starting value σ0j .
Depending on the value of the memory parameter m the
posterior belief of the agent becomes then Xj(θ, t + 1) =
mXj(θ, t) + (1−m)N(〈θ〉j(t), σ0j).
III. BASIC SIMULATION ASSUMPTIONS
In actual situations both the information sources and
the filters described in the previous section combine their
effects in quite complex ways. We encounter, in no par-
ticular order, information sources of various type, con-
tent and strength, in some cases acting alone, in others
- combined. To elucidate the model effects we shall ini-
tially focus on drastically simplified systems, in which
we would show the effects of the repeated application
of the same filter to the same information source
distribution Si(θ), for a range of starting belief distri-
butions Xj(θ, 0) (where the index j denotes individual
agents). The aim of this exercise is to show if particular
filters (no filter, confirmation bias, PMR) lead to stable
belief distributions, polarization, emotional involvement
etc.
As noted, for the simulations shown in this paper, we
shall be using the truth-related form of the information
source, ST (θ), assumed to take a rather broad Gaussian
form, centred at θT = 0.6 and with standard deviation
equal to 0.4. This choice of the information source dis-
tribution is motivated by two reasons. The first is to
check if the simulated society is capable of reaching con-
sensus when the information source points to a well de-
fined value. The second reason was to study the effects
of the asymmetry. Obviously, it is much easier for the
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Figure 8. Example of the indeterminacy reset (memory fac-
tor) of an individual agent i belief distribution. The current
(already quite narrow) belief distribution (thin black line),
centred at 〈θ〉i(t) is mixed with a normal distribution centred
at the same value, but with the standard deviation σ0j charac-
teristic for the agent (blue line shows the original distribution,
which is centred at 〈θ〉j(0)). The resulting distribution (red
line) exhibits the central peak but also some ‘tails’ that allow
the agent to accept beliefs further from the centre of its belief
function.
agents whose initial opinion distribution favours positive
θ values to ‘agree’ with an information source favouring
a positive θT . In contrast, the agents starting with belief
distributions preferring negative θ values, would have to
‘learn’ and to overcome their initial disagreement and to
significantly change their beliefs.
Each of the agents is initially characterized by a belief
function of a Gaussian form (bounded between −1 and
+1 and suitably normalized). The standard deviation
parameters for the agents σ0j are drawn from an uniform
random distribution limited between 0.05 and 0.2.
Three separate sets of agents are created and
used in the simulations: leftists, centrists and
rightists (we note here that these names have no con-
nection with the real world political stances and refer
to the position on the abstract θ axis). Each agent
community is composed of N agents (in the simulations
we use N = 1000). The leftists have their initial Gaus-
sian centre values 〈θ〉j(0) drawn from an uniform random
distribution bounded between −1 and −0.5. The centrist
group is formed by agents with 〈θ〉j(0) drawn from be-
tween −0.5 and 0.5, and the rightists have 〈θ〉j(0) drawn
from between 0.5 and 1. Figure 9 shows examples of the
agent belief functions for agents from each of the three
groups (thin blue, gray and green lines) and the initial
ensemble averaged belief distributions XG(θ, 0), where
G stands for L (leftists), C (centrists) and R (right-
Figure 9. Initial belief distributions of three classes of agents.
Blue: leftists (maximum of the initial belief drawn randomly
from between -1 and -0.5). Black: centrists (maximum belief
drawn from between -0.1 and 0.5). Green: rightists (maxi-
mum belief between 0.5 and 1). Thin, light lines: examples of
the belief distributions of a few individual agents, differing in
their initial centre of the belief θ0j and the width of the belief
distribution σ0j . Thick lines: averaged distributions for each
group.
ists). These ensemble averages are shown by thick lines.
There is some overlap between the leftist/centrist and
centrist/rightist groups, but practically no overlap be-
tween the leftist/rightist groups.
The simulations discrete time steps. The time is mea-
sured in time units in which each agent in the current
group has had a single chance to interact with the infor-
mation source or to ignore it (with the respective proba-
bilities of p and 1− p). As we shall show in the following
sections some effects become visible after just a few time
steps, but some other become important after thousands
or tens of thousands events. From the point of view of
the possible application of model results to the real life
phenomena we should consider the mapping of the ‘sim-
ulation time’ to real hours, days or weeks. In the current
work we focus on the long term behaviour of the system,
especially on the final stable conditions.
IV. MODEL RESULTS
A. Case 1: Unfiltered effects of true information
We shall start the description of the model results with
a relatively simple case, with the aim of showing the ef-
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Figure 10. No filtering applied, perfect memory. Time
evolution of the averages of beliefs of the three groups of
agents. Rightists: green, centrists: black, leftists: blue. Thin
line show evolution of the average belief 〈θ〉j(t) for individual
agents j. Thick lines show the evolution of the ensemble av-
erages for each group of the agents 〈θ〉G(t). Without filtering,
the truth-focused information eventually leads all the agents
to adopt the θT centred beliefs. The process for our choice of
θT = 0.6 is, of course, the easiest for the rightists, who start
with beliefs close to this value. However, eventually all the
groups achieve consensus. The case of the leftists (initially
holding views opposing θT ) is quite revealing: agents with
initially large tolerances (large initial σ0j) accept the truthful
information quickly; agents with very focused initial opinions
(small values of σ0j) hold on for longer times and then very
quickly join the majority. Simulations that use the p = 0.3
value show the periods in which the individual opinions re-
main unchanged (indicated by the flat segments of the thin
lines).
fects of some of the simulation parameters. The first case
is based on unfiltered processing of the ‘truth-related’
information, ST (θ), as shown in Figure 4. This is, as
we have noted, equivalent to the situation where the in-
formation flow is nonspecific (uniform) but the agents
employ a truth-seeking filter of the same form as ST (θ).
As the θT value is positive (equal to 0.6), the most inter-
esting question is how such information would influence
the agents who initially hold the opposite views (the ‘left-
ists’).
The speed with which the agents converge at the true
value consensus depends on the significant information
processing probability p. Figure 10 presents the time
evolution of individual agents’ average beliefs (〈θ〉j , thin
lines) and the ensemble averages 〈θ〉G for the three agent
groups. We start with agents characterized by perfect
memory (m = 1). The time evolution of the average
〈θ〉j for p < 1 looks qualitatively different than in the
case of p = 1. They exhibit a step-like structure, due to
‘freezing’ of beliefs if no processing takes place. However,
Figure 11. No filtering applied, perfect memory. Evo-
lution of the average mean value of the belief 〈θ〉L(t) over the
group of ‘leftists’ due to ‘truth-related’ information stream.
Time is measured in interactions per agent. Black-red curves
represent various values of the p parameter value. Decreasing
the probability of information-carrying encounters (smaller p)
makes the evolution of the beliefs slower. The pure Bayesian
evolution (p = 1) very quickly (in less than a 1000 time steps)
leads to the distribution of beliefs centred around θT . For
p < 1 the evolution of 〈θ〉L(t) is stretched in time proportion-
ally to p. Rescaling time to t′ = pt shows the invariant shape
of the evolution (inset).
the ensemble averages are quite similar for p < 1 and p =
1. Figure 11 shows the dependence of the time evolution
of the average belief for the whole leftist group 〈θ〉L on
the value of the parameter p (note the logarithmic scale of
the time axis). In fact, a simple rescaling of the time axis
to t′ = pt (shown in the inset) shows that the evolution is
really a simple slowdown due to inactivity periods, when
no information is processed. Thus for the perfect memory
(i.e. for m = 1), the role of p is rather trivial. It becomes
more important when the ‘idle’ times are used to partially
reset the individual uncertainty.
The truth-focused information flow eventually con-
vinces all the agents to believe in the ‘true’ value of
θT = 0.6, regardless of their initial positions. The pro-
cess is the fastest for agents with relatively broadminded
beliefs (high σ0j). For the agents with initial very narrow
belief distributions the transition is shifted to later times
– but then it is almost instantaneous (typical for Bayesian
update of single valued probabilities rather than distribu-
tions). The changes in the form of the belief distribution
consist of a more or less gradual ‘flow’ of beliefs from the
original form to a belief centred around the maximum
of ST (θ). This is well illustrated by Figure 12, which
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Figure 12. No filtering applied, perfect memory. Time
evolution of the ensemble averaged belief distribution over
the groups of leftists and rightists due to ‘truth-related’ infor-
mation stream. Time is measured in interactions per agent.
Black-blue and black-green curves: averaged belief X¯G(θ).
Red curve shows, for comparison, the original information
distribution ST (θ). Simulations use p = 1 value. As the time
passes, the beliefs transform from the starting polarized dis-
tributions (thick black lines) and converge to the ‘true’ value
of θT = 0.6.
presents the time evolution of the ensemble average be-
lief for the leftist and the rightist groups.
To understand the effects of the memory parameter
m, it is illustrative to study the effects of the indeter-
minacy reset on the evolution of the individual opinion
distributions Xj(θ, t). As shown in Figures 13 and 14 the
relaxation of the indeterminacy introduced by imperfect
memory factor m < 1 leads to a qualitatively different fi-
nal form of the individual belief distributions. Instead of
a set of narrow, delta-like functions grouped close to the
θT value typical for m = 1, the existence of belief relax-
ation leads to distributions of width comparable to the
original values of σ0j centred exactly at θT . Thus, while
the final ensemble average may be similar, the underlying
structure of the individual beliefs is quite different.
In the case of lack of filtering, the effects of the inde-
terminacy reset on group averages are rather subtle. For
a given value of p, decreasing the memory factor leads
to a small, but observable shortening of the time scale of
reaching the truth-based consensus (Figure 15). It is in-
teresting that even a very small admixture of uncertainty
reset (m = 0.99 instead of m = 1) significantly influences
the evolution of the group averaged belief 〈θ〉L.
B. Case 2: Individual confirmation bias filter of
true information, perfect memory (m = 1).
In the previous section we have shown that under the
influence of the truth-related information, without filter-
ing, all the agents eventually converge their beliefs on the
true value suggested by the information source. This is
not surprising, as the process is a simple, repetitive, ap-
plication of a Bayesian belief modification. We turn now
to the issue of the effects of filtering of the information
sources.
We shall start with the individual agent based con-
firmation bias filter. There are two reasons for this
choice. The first is that confirmation bias is widely rec-
ognized in psychological literature, so it ‘deserves’ a thor-
ough treatment in the ABM framework. The second rea-
son is a relative simplicity of the filter effects. Suppose
that the information flow on which the filter acts is non-
specific (i.e. uniform). If the initial belief distribution is
given by a Gaussian function with the standard devia-
tion σ, then the application of the same function acting
as the likelihood filter would lead to the posterior belief
in the Gaussian form, but with σ decreased by a factor
of
√
2. A repeated information processing would eventu-
ally lead to a Dirac delta-like belief distribution. In other
words, repeated application of confirmation bias narrows
and freezes one’s own opinions. Once should, therefore,
expect that the confirmation bias filter should diminish
the effects of specific information sources, such as the
truth-related source ST (θ).
The simulation setup for the case of confirmation bias
filtering of true information is relatively simple. At every
time step, with probability p each agent uses its current
belief Xj(t) as the pure filter. In this case the final like-
lihood function is defined by
FL(θ) = (fXj(θ, t) + (1− f)U)ST (θ), (2)
where we use the filter effectiveness f as parameter. As
before, with probability 1−p, the agent does not process
the information. In this section we focus on situations
m = 1, when the agent simply retains its previous belief.
In what follows, we use a fixed value p = 0.3. The crucial
parameter in Case 2 is the filter effectiveness f .
Figure 16 presents four snapshots of the evolution of
the individual belief distributions Xj(θ) for the leftist
group. The individual distributions change under the
competing influences of the confirmation bias filter (pro-
gressively narrowing the belief distributions) and the in-
formation (shifting the beliefs towards higher values of
θ).
The relative importance of these two factors depends
on the value of the filtering effectiveness factor f . If a
pure form of the filter is used (f = 1) the individual
beliefs coalesce to delta form in less than 10 time steps
and the average beliefs of the three groups remain practi-
cally unchanged (left panel in Figure 17). Thus, despite
the availability of true information, the centrist and left-
ist groups keep their beliefs. For much smaller, but still
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Figure 13. No filtering applied, perfect memory. Snapshots of examples of the individual agent belief distribution
functions for the leftist agents under the influence of the unfiltered ST (θ) information source. For the simulations p = 0.3 and
m = 1 (that is, perfect memory is assumed and no indeterminacy of beliefs occurs). As expected, the individual beliefs move
towards the true value of θT = 0.6, at the same time becoming increasingly narrow. There is only a partial overlap of the
individual opinions. The snapshots are taken at t = 5, 40, 160 and 1280 (shown in clockwise order).
non-negligible value of f = 0.2 (corresponding to Fig-
ure 16), we observe some change (more pronounced for
the leftist group, where the dissonance between the ini-
tial views and the true information is the largest, middle
panel in Figure 17).
It is only for very small values of f that the final dis-
tributions of beliefs begin to converge towards the truth-
related consensus. Even for f = 0.02 there is a sizeable
gap between the rightists and the centrists and leftists.
Figure 18 presents the shape of the ensemble averaged
belief distributions for each of the three groups at a very
late time t = 10000.
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Figure 14. No filtering applied, reset of belief indeterminacy. Snapshots of examples of the individual agent belief
distribution functions for the leftist agents under the influence of the unfiltered ST (θ) information source and with the indeter-
minacy reset present. For the simulations p = 0.3 and m = 0.5. In this case, not only do the individual beliefs move towards
the true value of θT = 0.6, but they also become almost fully overlapping. The snapshots are taken at t = 5, 40, 160 and 1280
(shown in clockwise order).
Figure 19 presents the dependence of the ensemble av-
eraged values of the average belief for each of the three
groups on the filtering effectiveness f . For f close to
1, the truth-related information is almost totally filtered
out by the confirmation bias, the agents quickly evolve
to fixed, delta-like belief distributions. For medium val-
ues (0.3 < f < 0.9) the rightists and the centrists show
no effects, but the leftists are gradually ‘convinced’ to
shift their opinions somewhat towards positive value. For
small values of the filtering effectiveness (f < 0.1) the
opinions of the three groups begin to converge, but get-
ting close to consensus requires very small values of f (on
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Figure 15. No filtering applied, overview of memory
effects. Time evolution of the leftist group ensemble average
〈θ〉L(t) for p = 0.4 and various values of the memory factor
m. Even a relatively small memory loss (m = 0.99) speeds up
the transition of 〈θ〉L to the true value θT . In other words,
agents with belief distributions which are (however seldom)
reset to more ‘broadminded’ values are more likely to learn
from the ‘truth-related’ information source.
the order of 0.02 or less).
C. Case 2a: Individual confirmation bias filter of
true information, reset of beliefs due to imperfect
memory (m < 1).
The confirmation bias filter very quickly leads to ex-
treme narrowing of the individual belief distributions (for
the fully effective case f = 1 this happens after a few tens
of interactions). This suggests that the inclusion of the
broadening mechanisms might have more significant ef-
fect than in the case of unfiltered information processing.
Indeed, settingm = 0.5 changes the evolution of the indi-
vidual beliefs dramatically, as we can see from Figure 20
(which corresponds to the ‘perfect memory’, m = 1 case
in Figure 16). In situation when the beliefs are affected
by the indeterminacy reset (which, we remind, does not
change the current individual average belief), they are
much more modifiable by the information source.
In the case of the ST (θ) information source, the effects
of the memory imperfection are most clearly seen by the
behaviour of the leftist group, because this group is the
furthest from the ‘true’ value θT . The change introduced
by the indeterminacy reset is best visualized when we
look at the time evolution of the group ensemble average
beliefs 〈θ〉L (Figure 21). The presence of the indeter-
minacy reset due to imperfect memory causes the indi-
vidual opinion distributions to retain some component of
broader beliefs and facilitates their shift due to the infor-
mation source influence. As the process of reaching the
consensus looks similar for all groups, this would lead to
a global consensus centred at the θT value. The process
〈θ〉L(t)→ θT is quite fast, on the order of a few hundreds
of time steps when m ≤ 0.3, but slows down for higher
values of m. Above m ≈ 0.9 (i.e. for an almost perfect
memory) the narrowing of the individual opinion distri-
butions dominates and the group average remain close
to their initial values. In plain words, when the agents
are allowed to become extremely close-minded due to the
confirmation bias, the truth-related information has lim-
ited effect, and the initial assumed polarization between
the leftists, centrists and rightists remains unchanged.
The transition between the polarized state at large
enough m and the consensus, for smaller m values, is
rather abrupt. Figure 22 presents the dependence of the
〈θ〉L(t) values on m, for two values of the filter effective-
ness f = 1 and 0.5 for three time snapshots, t = 1000,
10000 and 50000. Increasing the time leads to a step-like
transition between conditions preserving the polarization
and those leading to the consensus.
We recall here the brief discussion of the topic of map-
ping the simulation time to the real world units. Obvi-
ously, if we consider as events the cases when a person
encounters really new, significant information (e.g. lis-
tens to a candidate speech at a rally, or a debate, or reads
an important article in the press), then 50000 events is
obviously not realistic. Even a few hundred events (nec-
essary to reach consensus for very imperfect memory,
m ≈ 0) may be questioned. On the other hand, if we
treat the time ‘between the events’ - essentially the very
time in which the memory imperfection and uncertainty
reset would be expected to occur as single entities or,
perhaps, a multitude of them. A partial answer could be
provided by psychological research devoted to the issue
of the existence of the indeterminacy of opinion resets
and the associated conditions.
D. Case 3: Politically Motivated Reasoning filter
In contrast with the confirmation bias, the PMR fil-
ter is assumed to depend on the current beliefs of the
in-group, treated as a whole. In the simplest version,
we assume that any agent knows perfectly the ensemble
averaged belief distribution of its in-group XG(θ, t), and
uses it as a filter for information processing. The filter
is dynamical, because as the individual agents change
their beliefs, so does the average for the group. As in the
previous sections we focus on the truth-related informa-
tion source ST (θ) and assume that p = 0.3. Our focus
is, therefore, the role of the filter effectiveness f in the
evolution of the group belief distributions. The current
section considers the case of agents with perfect memory
(m = 1).
We shall start with Figure 23, which corresponds di-
rectly to the results for the confirmation bias filter (Fig-
ure 19). For very small values of f the averaged beliefs
converge on the true value, as the information source
‘gets through’, thanks to the uniform part of the filter.
On the other hand, for f ≈ 1, the PMR filtering mecha-
nism effectively freezes the group opinions. For the two
groups which are initially closer to the true opinion θT ,
namely the rightists 〈θ〉R and centrists 〈θ〉C , the fixed
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Figure 16. Confirmation bias filtering, perfect memory. Time evolution of individual belief distributions of selected
leftist agents using confirmation bias filtering of truth-related information for f = 0.2, p = 0.3 . The distributions are for a
subset of randomly selected leftist agents. As the time progresses (clockwise) the individual belief distributions shift to higher
θ values and become increasingly narrow. The first process is the influence of the new information favouring θT = 0.6, the
second is the result of the confirmation bias. Quite quickly (much faster than in the case of unfiltered information processing),
all agents evolve to delta-like belief distributions (the t = 80 panel). For f values greater than 0.05 the processes of narrowing
of the individual beliefs dominates over their shift towards the true value for a large number of the agents.
value remains unchanged as we lower f , and for very
small values of f it changes gradually, resembling the be-
haviour for the confirmation bias filter. For the leftists,
however, instead of a continuous change observed in the
confirmation bias case we observe a discontinuous tran-
sition at certain value fcrit = 0.43 (for the current set
agents and p = 0.3).
To understand this discontinuity we have to look into
18
Figure 17. Confirmation bias filtering, perfect memory. Time evolution of average beliefs 〈θ〉j (thin lines) and the
averages 〈θ〉 (thick lines) for the three groups of agents using confirmation bias, for three values of the filter effectiveness
f = 1, 0.2 and 0.01. The value of the information processing probability is p = 0.3. Decreasing the effectiveness of the
confirmation bias filter delays the time at which the individual opinion distributions become fixed and delta-like, shown in the
figure as think horizontal lines. In some cases we observe jumps in the opinion, typical for discrete Bayesian updates.
the details of the evolution of the individual belief dis-
tributions. The two following Figures (24 and 25) show
examples of time snapshots of the individual belief distri-
butions Xj(θ, t), collected for f just above the transition
value (f = 0.43) and below it (f = 0.42). The starting
point is the same in the two cases. The initial evolution
(t < 10) is driven by the interplay of the asymmetry of
the information source (favouring positive values of θ)
and the PMR filter. It leads to formation of two attrac-
tors, around which the individual agents group: one close
to the upper end of the original leftist domain (around
θ = −0.5) and the second, corresponding to partially
‘convinced’ agents, located around θ = 0.1. The decrease
of the filter effectiveness f increases the number of agents
in the latter group. Because the ensemble averaged be-
lief distribution enters the process for the next iteration,
for f < 0.42, a positive feedback mechanism leads to
the eventual dominance of the convinced group. On the
other hand, for f > 0.43 the size of the convinced group
is too small to persist, and eventually all agents retain or
revert to their leftist stance.
The results for the Politically Motivated Reasoning fil-
ter were obtained using an assumption that the compo-
sition of the group to which an agent looks for the belief
guidance remains unchanged. The simulations assume
that each agent considers the whole group, defined in the
initial input files, to calculate the ensemble averaged be-
lief distribution XG(θ, t), which would be used as the fil-
ter. This leads to the case when the more flexible agents,
who have shifted their opinion can eventually pull the
whole group with them (for small enough f values).
Such assumption might be criticized from a sociologi-
cal point of view. In a situation, such as that depicted
in t = 50 panels of Figures 24 and 25, where the belief
systems of the agents flexible and inflexible agents have
very little overlap, one could expect that each of the sub-
groups would restrict their PMR filter to the group
of the currently like-minded agents. In other words,
the flexibles, who have moved away from the initial group
average, would be rejected by the less flexible agents, as
traitors of the cause, and disregarded when calculating
the PMR filter. The obvious result would be a split of
the initial group, occurring within just a few filtered it-
erations (somewhere between t = 25 and t = 50). In
such approach it would be useful to change the simula-
tion measurements from the group averages of belief 〈θ〉G
to the numbers of the inflexibles, unconvinced by the in-
formation, and the agents who have shifted their beliefs.
Such a dynamical group composition model variant shall
be the topic of later works.
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Figure 18. Confirmation bias filtering, perfect memory. Averaged distributions of agent beliefs in the three groups.
Thick, smooth lines: initial distributions, thin lines: distributions after 10000 steps. Results for three f values are shown f = 1,
f = 0.2 and f = 0.01.
Figure 19. Confirmation bias filtering, perfect memory.
Dependence of the final value of 〈θ〉G for the three groups as
functions of filtering effectiveness f for the confirmation bias
filter. Note that the convergence of opinions near the true
value requires very weak filtering (f < 0.5).
E. Case 3a: PMR filter with imperfect memory
(m < 1)
The discontinuous change in the system behaviour, de-
scribed in the previous section, results from the extreme
narrowing of the individual belief distributions, due to
the repeated application of the filter. Guided by the anal-
yses of the confirmation bias filter with imperfect mem-
ory, we expect that the reset of individual belief indeter-
minacy should significantly change the system behaviour.
Figure 26, which presents the results for m = 0.5, con-
firms these expectations are true. Instead of the dis-
crete jump seen for the leftist group in the unmodified
m = 1 case (Figure 23), we observe smooth changes of
all group averages of beliefs 〈θ〉G. Moreover, a full con-
sensus is reached for finite (although small) values of f .
An additional difference in the simulations for the imper-
fect memory PMR filter from all cases considered so far,
is that simulation runs converge to somewhat different
configurations. We have indicated this as error bars in
Figure 26.
The roughly linear dependence of 〈θ〉L on f , for f >
0.1, results from the increased individual opinion flexi-
bility introduced by the admixture of the broad-minded
component of the individual beliefs treated as priors. To
better understand this, we have studied the dependence
of 〈θ〉L on the memory factor m for fixed values of f .
The results are shown in Figure 27. In the case of rela-
tively effective PMR filter (f = 0.7 and f = 1.0) there
are two distinct regimes of system behaviour. Above cer-
tain threshold value mT (f), there is only a weak, linear
dependence of 〈θ〉L on m, mostly due to individual be-
lief shifts during a few initial time steps, which quickly
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Figure 20. Confirmation bias filtering, reset of belief indeterminacy. Snapshots in the evolution of individual belief
distributions of selected leftist agents using confirmation bias filtering of truth-related information for f = 0.2, p = 0.3 with
the memory imperfection factor m = 0.5. The distributions are for a subset of randomly selected leftist agents. As the time
progresses (clockwise) the individual belief distributions shift to higher θ values but remain rather broad-shaped (as are the
original distributions). Much greater number of agents move to the true belief θT . Eventually all agents would reach consensus
at this value.
become frozen. On the other hand, for m smaller than
mT (f), all agents shift their opinions in accordance with
the information source, moving eventually to centrist and
rightist positions. The value of mT (f) is only approxi-
mate, as a consequence of the differences between individ-
ual simulation runs, due to the finite size of the system.
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Figure 21. Confirmation bias filtering, memory effects.
Time dependence of the value of 〈θ〉L for the leftist group for
various values of the memory parameter m, for f equal to 1.
Reducing the value of m changes the evolution of the individ-
ual beliefs, and, in consequence, the group average 〈θ〉L(t):
for m smaller than certain value (significant broadening), all
agents become ‘convinced’ by the information source and ac-
cept the θT as the centre of their belief distributions. The
conviction process is the fastest for the lowest values of m.
On the other hand, for m > 0.9 the agents’ belief distri-
butions remain frozen, which means that the whole system
would exhibit significant polarization.
Figure 22. Confirmation bias filtering, memory effects.
Dependence of the value of leftist group ensemble average
〈θ〉L(t) as function of the memory parameter m, for two val-
ues of the filtering effectiveness f = 1 and f = 0.5, and for
three time values, t = 1000, 10000 and 50000 steps. For
small m values, the group average converges on the true value
θt = 0.6. For large m values (better memory, i.e. lesser role of
indeterminacy reset) the beliefs remain on the left side of the
opinion spectrum. Increasing the time t at which we measure
the 〈θ〉L(t), makes the transition between two regimes (pre-
serving the original opinions and accepting the true value)
less gradual as function of the memory fidelity parameter m.
Figure 23. Politically Motivated Reasoning filtering,
perfect memory. Dependence of the final value of 〈θ〉G for
the three groups, as functions of filtering effectiveness f for the
PMR filter.For f & 0.43 the averages are almost independent
of f . At f ≈ 0.43 (marked by the red ellipse), the 〈θ〉L shows
a large jump towards the θT value, the result effectively turns
the leftists into centrists. For very small values of the filtering
effectiveness (f < 0.1) opinions of all three groups converge
on the true value θt = 0.6.
V. DISCUSSION
A. Time dependency considerations
The choice of the right simulation-to-reality time scal-
ing may depend on the way we define the information
processing events. On one hand, we could consider only
the major news and real world occurrences, such as
the crucial election stories and events. In such a case,
the number of the opinion shaping encounters could be
treated as relatively small, certainly not in the range of
tens of thousands or thousands per month. In such a
view, the time periods between the information process-
ing events are long enough to allow the uncertainty reset.
At the other end of the spectrum is the vision, in which
our beliefs are shaped by a continuous stream of events,
differing in their source type, intensity, repetition and
many other characteristics. Some of these would orig-
inate from external sources, characterized by relatively
stable views and opinions (biased or unbiased at the
source), while other events could originate from more or
less random encounters with other people or observations
of ostensibly small importance. In such microscopic ap-
proach, the number of the events could be very large.
The focus of this work was on the long term effects of
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Figure 24. Politically Motivated Reasoning filtering, perfect memory. Time snapshots of the individual belief distri-
butions for the PMR filter for f = 0.43. The individual agent’s belief distributions at t ≈ 25 are divided into the ‘inflexibles’
– with opinions centred around θ ≈ −0.5, and the agents who were influenced by the news source, with their distributions
centred around θ ≈ 0. Thick dark line shows the average distribution of beliefs - which serves as a filter for the next time step.
For f greater than 0.43 the number of the influenced agents is too small, and repeated interactions diminish the influence of
the θ ≈ 0 filter peak. At t = 100 all agents revert to the leftist positions.
a single type of an information source, interspersed with
the periods when the individual belief structure may be-
come less certain. The goal was to construct a Bayes
based filtered information processing ABM and see if
such approach can yield ‘reasonable results’, by which
we mean, depending on the situation, conditions leading
to a general consensus, or, for other conditions, a per-
sistent disagreement and polarization. The results have
shown that the model can, indeed, produce these results
under simple manipulation of a few key parameters.
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Figure 25. Politically Motivated Reasoning filtering, perfect memory. Time snapshots of the individual belief dis-
tributions for the PMR filter for f = 0.42. As before, the individual agent’s belief distributions at t ≈ 25 are divided into
the ‘inflexibles’ – with opinions centred around θ ≈ −0.5, and the agents who were influenced by the news source, with their
distributions centred around θ ≈ 0. Thick dark line shows the average distribution of beliefs - which serves as a filter for the
next time step. For f smaller or equal 0.42 the number of the influenced agents becomes large enough to eventually dominate,
and the repeated interactions move all agents to the centrist position. The jump observed in Figure 23 occurs when the number
of the influenced agents passes the necessary threshold. Due to the positive feedback, once the peak θ ≈ 0 dominates the
filtering, the repeated filtered information processes further increase its the size in the subsequent interactions.
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Figure 26. Politically Motivated Reasoning filtering,
reset of belief indeterminacy. Dependence of the final
value of 〈θ〉G for the three groups, as functions of filtering
effectiveness f for the PMR filter with imperfect memory
m = 0.5. The broadening of the individual belief distribu-
tions due to the imperfect memory restores the almost linear
dependence of the ensemble average value of opinion for the
leftist group. The resulting opinion distribution for the leftist
group 〈θ〉L, for f > 0.6, shows sizeable differences between
the individual simulation runs, which are indicated by error
bars.
The question of the ‘right’ timescale for opinion change
can not be resolved by such qualitative, simplified
model. Among the unknowns are the effectiveness of the
Bayesian update process and the filtering, the memory
imperfection related uncertainty reset scale, and the el-
ements omitted in the current model, for example dif-
ferences in the intensity of particular events. A more
realistic model should be based on psychological studies
- which would, hopefully, provide also suggestions as to
whether we should focus on the effects of a few (few tens?
hundreds?) information processing events or to look at
the stable or quasi-stable states reached after thousands
of microscopic events.
B. Manipulation of the Politically Motivated
Reasoning Filter
The current political developments in many demo-
cratic societies show dramatically increasing levels of
polarization, covering the general public and the me-
dia (PEW [1], Baldassarri and Bearman [5], Bernhardt
et al. [11], Fiorina and Abrams [31], Prior [69], Stroud
[86], Tewksbury and Riles [94]). In many countries the
Figure 27. Politically Motivated Reasoning filtering,
memory effects. Dependence of the final value of 〈θ〉G for
the leftist group on the memory factor m, for two values of
the filtering effectiveness f for the PMR filter. Dots show
results of the individual simulation runs. Red ellipses indicate
the regions close to the threshold value of m, at which the
behaviour of the system changes. Decreasing the memory
quality from the perfect case (m = 1) leads initially to very
slight, linear shift in the 〈θ〉L value, attributable to belief
changes in the first few interactions. Below the threshold
value (which depends on f) the group opinion average grows
to approach the true value of θT for m < 0.1. The black lines
are separate best fits of linear function (for m greater than
a threshold value) and quadratic function for m smaller than
it.
chances of reaching the state in which a rational discus-
sions between conflicted groups (not to mention working
out a sensible compromise) seems almost impossible. Re-
cent US presidential elections provide an obvious exam-
ple, but the seemingly irrevocable split exists in many
other aspects, sometimes with division lines not parallel
to political ones. A good example of such split is the
existence and (in many countries) growth of the anti-
vaccination movements (Betsch [12], Betsch and Sachse
[13], Blume [14], Davies et al. [26], Hough-Telford et al.
[44], Kata [53], Leask et al. [55], McKeever et al. [57], Nel-
son [58], Ołpiński [64], Streefland [85], Wolfe and Sharp
[104]), which are not strictly ‘politically’ aligned. The ef-
forts to convince vaccination opponents are quite unsuc-
cessful, regardless of the approach used. Similar prob-
lems occur in more politicized issues. This applies to the
cases where suitable evidence is available, for example in
controversies over gun control policies, climate change,
GMO, nuclear energy, and in cases where the beliefs and
opinions are largely subjective, such as evaluations of spe-
cific politicians (e.g. Hillary Clinton or Donald Trump).
The difficulty in minimizing the polarization may be
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partially attributed to the cognitive biases and motivated
information processing described in this paper. Filtering-
out of information may be very effective in keeping a per-
son’s beliefs unchanged. In fact, some cognitive heuristics
are evolved to provide this stability (e.g. the confirmation
bias). This makes the task of bridging the gaps between
polarized sections of our societies seem impossible. Still,
as Kahan has noted, some filtering mechanisms may be
more flexible than others.
A good example is provided by comparison of the con-
firmation bias and PMR. Kahan [50] notes that in some
cases PMR may be confused with the confirmation bias:
Someone who engages in politically motivated reasoning
will predictably form beliefs consistent with the position
that fits her predispositions. Because she will also selec-
tively credit new information based on its congeniality to
that same position, it will look like she is deriving the
likelihood ratio from her priors. However, the correlation
is spurious: a ‘third variable’—her motivation to form
beliefs congenial to her identity – is the “cause” of both
her priors and her likelihood ratio assessment. Kahan
notes the importance of the difference: if the source of
the filter is ‘internal’ (confirmation bias), we have little
hope to modify it. On the other hand, if the motivation
for filtering is related to perceptions of in-group norms,
the opinions may be changed if the perception of
these in-group norms changes. Re-framing the issues
in a language that conforms to specific in-group identify-
ing characteristics or providing information that certain
beliefs are ‘in agreement’ with the value system of the
in-group and/or majority of its members, would change
the PMR filtering mechanism. Through this change,
more information could be allowed through, changing the
Bayesian likelihood function, and, eventually, changing
the posterior beliefs.
C. Model extensions and further research
directions
The simulations presented in the current work are
based on drastically simplified assumptions: only a sin-
gle source of information, with consistently repeated S(θ)
distribution, only one type of the filter, our focus is on
long term stable conditions. These simplifications di-
rectly indicate the directions of further work: dealing
with conflicting information sources, combinations of dif-
ferent types of filters, transient phenomena to describe
immediate reactions to the exposure of news. Another
planned model extension is related to modelling the pos-
sible dynamical nature of the group norms based PMR
filter, mentioned in Section IVD. When opinions within a
group initially treated as homogeneous begin to diverge,
it is quite likely that the very definition of the group
would change. The agents could redefine the criteria
who they count as the members of the in-group, treat-
ing those with sufficiently different belief distributions
as outsiders (possibly with a negative emotional label of
traitors). Such a move would dynamically redefine the
perceived in-group standards and norms. The resulting
change in the PMR filter could change the model dy-
namics from opinion shifts to changes in group sizes and
identification.
The model proposed in this work may be characterised
as a ‘reach feature agent’, in contrast to the simpli-
fied ‘spinson’ models. To examine the possibilities of the
approach, we have focused on a system in which agents
repeatedly react to an unchanging, single external infor-
mation source. This has allowed to discover some regu-
larities and to understand the roles of the model param-
eters.
The same general framework of biased processing of in-
formation may be used in more complex environments. It
can cover the agents interacting among themselves in ar-
bitrarily chosen social networks. In such scenario, the in-
put information would be generated by one of the agents
(a sender) and would be received and evaluated using
the filtering mechanisms and biases by other agent or
agents (recipient(s)). Each recipient would then update
its opinion (as described by the belief distribution), and,
if applicable for the bias type, also the filter function. Of
course, it is possible to reverse the roles of the agents and
to allow bidirectional communication. Because the filters
used by the communicating agents may be different, the
interaction process may be asymmetric. It is also possi-
ble to combine the agent-to-agent interactions with the
influences of external information sources, and to create
a truly complex model approximating a real society.
Lastly, especially in the case of the studies of short
term, transient changes, the possibilities of manipulation
of the filters by outside agencies, offer a very interesting
and important future research direction. Such investiga-
tions should cover both the manipulations increasing po-
larization (partisan information sources and the reliance
on emotional context of the information) as well as the
efforts in the opposite direction – to detect and to combat
the manipulative influences. The latter are especially im-
portant to enhance the chances of a meaningful dialogue
in our already highly polarized societies.
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